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Abstract. Personal information is increasingly gathered and used for providing services tailored to
user preferences, but the datasets used to provide such functionality can represent serious privacy
threats if not appropriately protected. Work in privacy-preserving data publishing targeted privacy
guarantees that protect against record re-identification, by making records indistinguishable, or sen-
sitive attribute value disclosure, by introducing diversity or noise in the sensitive values. However,
most approaches fail in the high-dimensional case, and the ones that don’t introduce a utility cost
incompatible with tailored recommendation scenarios. This paper aims at a sensible trade-off be-
tween privacy and the benefits of tailored recommendations, in the context of privacy-preserving
data publishing. We empirically demonstrate that significant privacy improvements can be achieved
at a utility cost compatible with tailored recommendation scenarios, using a simple partition-based
sanitization method.
Keywords. Recommender systems, Data anonymization and sanitization, Privacy-preserving data
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1 Introduction
The value of personal information for use in data mining is clear to everyone involved in
the digital economy. Features like product recommendations and tailored advertising are
usually welcomed by customers and, on the business side, consumer information is used
by companies to define their strategies. However, the information required for either case
is created from the analysis of personal data, which is increasingly collected and stored by
businesses. This situation has originated a debate on the privacy issues of recent informa-
tion gathering practices, especially driven by the widespread adoption of social networking
sites and by their common practice of making available user’s information to advertisers
and application developers.
User data is many times made available to third parties in an supposedly anonymized
form. However, the employed anonymization mechanisms are often naı¨ve, relying on the
replacement or deletion of common identifiers such as names and email addresses. Such
methods are vulnerable to inference attacks because information that is apparently non-
personally identifiable, such as zip code, sex and birth date, can be combined to identify
the user. Sweeney determined that with those 3 attributes it is possible to identify 87% of
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the US population [41]. A well known case where privacy concerns were raised involved
the Netflix Prize [33]. The Netflix Prize was a data mining competition whose objective
was to crowd-source data mining algorithms for use in movie recommendations. Netflix
released a sanitized movie ratings dataset for participants to use, suppressing the users’
common identifiers, leaving only a meaningless user identification number. Using infor-
mation crawled from IMDb, Narayanan and Shmatikov successfully re-identified a num-
ber of users from the Netflix dataset, showing that it was vulnerable to privacy attacks [31].
Netflix was to organize a follow up competition, Prize 2, which was cancelled due to con-
cerns expressed by the Federal Trade Commission on the potential privacy infringements
[14].
Recommendation techniques are alsowidely applied in other domains, such as e-commerce
site items. Getting automatic recommendations for which items are worth looking at is es-
sential when navigating a large search space. The datasets that enable this kind of analysis
are designated as high-dimensional because they have a very large number of attributes -
all the available movies or shopping items. They typically contain the known affinity val-
ues, such as ratings, between each user record and the attributes. However, these values
are only known for a small fraction of the attributes, as each user only watches or rates a
small number of available movies, meaning such datasets are typically sparse. The typical
goal of data mining workloads used in such datasets is to estimate the null values, in order
to provide tailored item recommendations to users.
Previous work in privacy preserving high-dimensional data publishing has targeted a
static privacy goal when sanitizing such datasets. However, the utility costs of these ap-
proaches are evaluated in generic ways, with little results on how they perform in tailored
recommendation scenarios. In this paper we propose a utility metric that can provide this
insight. Furthermore we propose a metric to measure privacy instead of targeting a fixed
goal, enabling working with scenarios where utility is not simply sacrificed for privacy,
but instead the trade-off is improved. Also, a simple partitioning-based dataset sanitiza-
tion method is described, applied to two high-dimensional datasets, and compared to a
baseline state-of-the-art method.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes previouswork in high-dimensional
privacy preserving data publishing, focusing various perspectives as the assumptions and
utility metrics considered. Section 3 introduces a utility metric adjusted to tailored recom-
mendation scenarios and a privacy metric, instead of the traditional objective. In Section 4
we explain our partition-based approach to privacy preserving data publishing in tailored
recommendations scenarios. In Section 5 the characteristics of the datasets are analysed
and we establish reference algorithms for the experiments. In Section 6 the experimen-
tal results are described and, finally, Section 7 presents a summary of contributions and
proposes future work.
2 Previous Work
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
Notable examples of supposedly anonymized data releases, which prompted legal and PR
problems for the involved companies, include the AOL search queries [5], the Netflix Prize
dataset, and Sweeney’s zip code, sex and birth date example [41]. In this last one, a num-
ber of key attributes were used to infer the identity of the person to which a certain dataset
row refers to. In order to address this issue, the term quasi-identifier was coined in the
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definition of k-anonymity [42], a reference privacy concept. Quasi-identifiers are attributes
such as birth date and zip code, easy to obtain, typically part of the attackers auxiliary in-
formation, while sensitive attributes are the ones which the attacker aims to discover the
value of. Sweeney protects privacy with k-anonymity by limiting re-identification based on
quasi-identifiers. Informally, a dataset satisfies k-anonymity if and only if for each row of
the dataset there are at least k-1 other rows with the same quasi-identifier values. In order
to enforce this, the quasi-identifier values are generalized, masking their real values with
more generic ones when necessary. In these groups of at least k elements (i.e. equivalence
classes) the rows are indistinguishable regarding their quasi-identifiers. k-anonymity ef-
fectively targets the quasi-identifiers, improving resilience against re-identification attacks,
but disregards the sensitive attributes.
A follow up approach dubbed l-diversity [26] captures this shortcoming by presenting
an approach that resists to two types of attacks to which k-anonymity is vulnerable: a
homogeneity and a background knowledge attack. In these attacks sensitive attributes
can be leaked even if the attacker cannot associate the individual with a single row of the
equivalence class, it just requires that the sensitive values are not diverse enough. Li et
al. [24] further analysed these issues and proposed a privacy model that formalizes the
privacy breach as the change of knowledge of the attacker as he comes in contact with a
dataset. This approach, dubbed t-closeness, considers three attacker information states:
1. the attacker’s prior belief (auxiliary information),
2. the attacker’s belief after knowing the overall distribution on sensitive attributes in
the released database,
3. the attacker’s belief after knowing the distribution on sensitive attributes of the rows
that match the target person.
Li et al. assume the overall distribution of sensitive attributes is very similar to the one
from the global population, which configures public data, having very little information
state change between 1 and 2. Consequently t-closeness focuses on protecting privacy by
reducing the difference of information between information states 2 and 3, which implies
approximating the distributions of sensitive attributes of each equivalence class to the over-
all sensitive attributes distribution. It is not enough that the sensitive attributes are diverse
for each equivalence class, as l-diversity states, but that their sensitive value distribution is
similar enough to the overall sensitive value distribution.
Generalization is a technique commonly used to achieve k-anonymity and similar privacy
goals. However, it requires domain-specific hierarchies, making it unsuitable to be applied
to every attribute without greatly reducing the dataset utility. Other value obfuscation
methods have been proposed that can be applied to all the attributes, namely perturbation
[4] and condensation [3]. Perturbation works by introducing error in the values according
to a known density function, making it possible to recover generic statistical properties of
the original data, but difficult to re-identify records since the error for a specific record is
unknown. Condensation, unlike perturbation, considers the fact that attribute values are
typically not independent. The data is “condensed” in a predefined number of groups and
then randomly re-generated based on each group’s statistical properties. This allows cor-
relations between different groups to be preserved while making individual data records
indistinguishable within the groups. Changing the number of groups allows to adjust the
trade-off between privacy and data utility.
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2.2 High-Dimensional Datasets
High-dimensional datasets are datasets with many attributes, such as the Netflix dataset,
where ratings were given to 17 thousand different movies. High-dimensional datasets are
usually sparse: each record typically has a (non-null) value defined only for a small fraction
of the attributes. Also, the distribution of the attribute support is typically long-tailed: there
is a small number of attributes that have non-null values for many records while there is a
large number of attributes that only have non-null values for a few records. A side effect of
this is that records are very distinguishable, even by merely considering which attributes
are defined and which ones aren’t, representing an anonymity threat even if attribute val-
ues are obfuscated or omitted [31, 1].
A wide range of work has been done towards addressing privacy in high-dimensional
datasets. Xu et al. [46] formulate the privacy problem in a way that allows them to relate
some amount of auxiliary information with the probability of sensitive attribute disclosure,
and propose a suppression-based algorithm so that the dataset complies with that privacy
requirement. In subsequent work [45], the concept of frequent itemsets are used in order to
minimize the utility lost in the suppression process. Ghinita et al. [16] propose Correlation-
aware Anonymization of High-dimensional Data (CAHD) to protect non-null occurrences
of sensitive attributes in an high-dimensional dataset. The rationale is to form a group
of similar records for each sensitive occurrence and associate the sensitive occurrence to a
group rather than to a specific record. More recently, Parra-Arnau et al. [36] took a theo-
retical approach to high-dimensional privacy-preserving data publishing, and formulated
it as an optimization problem addressed through data suppression and forgery (dubbed
artificial or synthetic data in other work).
The high-dimensional case has also been targeted by privacy work that does not target
data publishing, but instead interactive data access. Chawla et al. [11] presents an impor-
tant base in this field by considering all attributes as dimensions of a hyper-cube of records
and formulating mathematical definitions for privacy and sanitization. Also, two saniti-
zation methods are proposed: one that relies in histograms to transmit the data - coarsely
groups records to provide relevant statistical information - and another that uses perturba-
tion to make records less identifiable (or isolated, in their terminology). Promising work
has been recently done towards achieving Differential Privacy [13] in high-dimensional
datasets. McSherry and Mironov [27] adapt the most common prediction techniques used
for the Netflix Prize to return differentially private recommendations. The experimental
results show impressive RMSE results, however the responses are differentially private re-
garding the detection of ratings and not users, which would require much more aggressive
noise addition, as the authors themselves note. However, the interactive data access model
that these approaches assume has fundamental implications on the adversary model and
data applications, which differ from the data publishing model targeted in this paper.
2.3 The Quasi-Identifier Assumption
Most work in privacy-preserving data publishing [15] relies on the assumption that at-
tributes can be classified as quasi-identifying or sensitive, where quasi-identifiers are at-
tributes that are relatively easy to gather from other sources - which compose the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information - and sensitive attributes are the target of the privacy attack.
However, in many situations the quasi-identifier and sensitive attribute separation cannot
be clearly defined. Considering diverse real life scenarios, the sensitive attributes in one
case may not be sensitive in another case: an individual’s home address is sensitive infor-
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mation in a database of high profile art collectors, while it is a quasi-identifier in most other
databases. Also, without assuming limitations on the adversary’s access to information
about an individual, any big enough set of attributes can be considered quasi-identifier as
together the attributes are likely to re-identify that individual.
Re-identification attacks are usually agnostic to the semantics of the attributes and rely
instead on two properties that are common to many types of personal information [32].
First is the stability of data across time, enabling datasets that are not temporally coincident
to be used together in re-identification, and thus making it easier to have available auxiliary
information. Secondly, if the quantity and precision of the data attributes is high enough,
then it becomes highly unlikely that two individuals have the same set of values. This is
especially easy in the high-dimensional case, prompting the discussion of what personally
identifiable information truly is, and whether any type of information can be distinguished
between personally identifiable and non-identifiable simply by its semantic.
Regarding the attributes of high-dimensional datasets, e.g. the movies rated and the items
bought, while some movies/items have more potential to harm than others, it is not clear
which attributes are sensitive. They are potentially all sensitive depending on the disclo-
sure context: buddies would potentially crack jokes if they knew the rating given to some
musical movie or the future employer could have second thoughts about hiring if he knew
the rating given to certain ideology-charged movies, and so on.
Unlike previously discussed work [46, 45, 16], we and many other authors drop this as-
sumption altogether in the high-dimensional case: any attribute can belong to the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information and all attributes are to be protected. Notably, Terrovitis et
al. [43] proposed a new version of k-anonymity for set-valued high-dimensional data, km-
anonymity, because k-anonymity assumes the existence of quasi-identifiers, and because
the methods to achieve it do not scale to the high-dimensional case [30]. Given an adver-
sary with auxiliary information of at most m attributes about a record, a km-anonymous
dataset must contain at least k records undistinguishable with respect to those attributes.
The authors also describe a generalization-based method to make set-valued high-dimen-
sional datasets km-anonymous. This privacy guarantee is also adopted in a cluster-based
generalization technique [17].
2.4 Partitioning-Based Techniques
The generalization and perturbation techniques commonly used with low-dimensional
datasets are sometimes also applied to the high-dimensional case. However, as pointed
out in Section 2.2, records of high-dimensional dataset are very distinguishable by merely
considering which attributes are defined and which ones aren’t [31, 1]. For that reason,
dataset partitioning has been increasingly explored as an alternative technique for protect-
ing privacy in the high-dimensional case. One of the advantages of partitioning is that the
resulting dataset values remain unchanged - what changes is the records they are associ-
ated with.
Li et al. [25] propose Slicing: a vertical and horizontal partitioning method that complies
with l-diversity. They argue that because vertical partitioning is used, slicing can be used in
high-dimensional scenarios and test the algorithm on the Netflix dataset. However, as also
noted by Terrovitis et al. [44], Slicing cannot handle sparse data. For the Netflix validation
performed by them, the dataset’s null values were replaced with the average rating of the
movie, removing sparsity - the main source of distinguishability between records [31, 1].
Furthermore, the quasi-identifier and sensitive information assumption is present in this
approach.
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More promisingly, Chen et al. [12] describe a probabilistic top-down partitioning algo-
rithm to generate differentially private data releases. Unlike most work done under Dif-
ferential Privacy that considers an interactive approach to data access, Chen’s goal is to
publish a dataset via differential privacy. Also, in work following up the use of general-
ization in the high-dimensional case [43], Terrovitis et al. choose to use disassociation, a
horizontal and vertical partitioning approach, to guarantee km-anonymity in a dataset of
web query terms [44].
Recently Zakerzadeh et al. [47] published a vertical partitioning approach to achieve k-
anonymity in high-dimensional datasets. The type of partitioning used differs from the one
used by Terrovitis et al. [44], as it is applied uniformly to all records. They note that while
all the theoretical difficulties of the dimensionality curse [1] remain true, their impact can
be reduced by relying on common properties of real-life datasets.
2.5 Privacy for Recommender Systems
The term collaborative filteringwas coined by the developers of one of the first recommender
systems, and is commonly used to refer to such systems even if the system does not drive
its users to collaborate explicitly [40]. Recommender systems can be functionally classified
into three major groups [21]:
1. generic recommenders, which recommend sets of “good” items to the user;
2. utility optimization recommenders, a generic recommender tuned to the goals of the
business implementing it;
3. prediction recomenders, which attempt to predict user opinion (i.e. rating) over a set
of items.
Generic recommenders can rely only on aggregate data, such as average and total number
of ratings, not requiring access to the full dataset. Some web sites simply keep track of the
rating average of each item and the aggregate number of ratings in order to produce “pop-
ularity” driven recommendations. Thus, unsurprisingly, most literature on recommender
systems focuses on prediction recommenders, which provide recommendations tailored to
each user. These rely on the assumption that if some users rate some items similarly, they
will also rate other items in a similar way. In order to identify these similarities, predic-
tion recommenders analyse large ratings datasets [40], such as the one from Netflix Prize.
Data mining is performed by the system on such high-dimensional datasets in order to es-
timate the missing values, which can be used to predict the rating that users would give to
each item. Throughout this paper we will refer to recommendations given by prediction
recommenders as tailored recommendations.
Pre-existing privacy work for recommenders can be classified based on the topology of
the recommender system: centralized or distributed. In the centralized case, the goal of
privacy work is to keep the recommender system from knowing the exact rating while still
providing with useful recommendations. Similarly to the work in privacy preserving data
publishing, the recommender system, which may be the adversary, has unrestricted access
to the dataset after it has been published.
Privacy work addressing centralized recommenders is similar to the work seen in pri-
vacy-preserving data publishing. Approaches typically rely in the application of some per-
turbation to the ratings given by users before they are supplied to the centralized entity.
Polat and Du [39] use perturbation, as do Berskovsky et al. [6] along with simpler obfusca-
tion techniques. Their privacy model aims to hide from the centralized recommender, with
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Privacy Scenario Accessible Data
Recommender
Applicability
Aggregate
data release
Rating average and
count per item
Generic
recommendations
Interactive
aggregate queries
Sanitized aggregate
query responses
Generic
recommendations
Distributed
recommenders
Aggregate
rating matrix
Tailored
recommendations
High-dimensional
data publishing
Sanitized
high-dimensional
dataset
Tailored
recommendations
Table 1: Recommender Privacy Scenarios
sufficient probability, the real rating the user provided to each item. However, the attack
models considered here do not include the use of auxiliary information.
In the case of distributed recommenders, a dataset of ratings given by numerous indi-
vidual users is never collected and processed by a central entity. Users of such systems
collaborate in a peer-to-peer manner in order to rate items such that the best rated items
are recommended. The privacy goal here is keeping the values of ratings known only to
the user that gave them. The adversaries are the other users that collaborate in rating the
item. This enables new attack models, such as the ones proposed recently by [35].
A well established approach for the peer-to-peer case is the use of some homomorphic
encryption scheme in the collaborative filtering protocol, as do Canny [8] and many others
after him (e.g. [48, 37]). Homomorphic encryption enables a number of users sharing
their encrypted ratings with each other and being able to retrieve the aggregate ratings.
Furthermore, Canny [8] describes some degree of tailoring is possible using this scheme by
locally correlating user preferences and the aggregate ratings model.
It’s also possible to consider the interactive data access model in the context of recom-
mender scenarios. In this case the attacker and the recommender also doesn’t have access
to the full dataset, only to aggregate queries performed on it. Differential Privacy, widely
recognized in the data privacy community as a very strict privacy guarantee, is built on
this model which is obviously capable of producing generic recommendations through ag-
gregate results.
Table 1 synthesizes the applications of different privacy protectionmodels to recommender
scenarios. We assume that the recommendations and the adversary access data under the
same model, and classify the possible recommendations under each scenario. We also add
a naı¨ve case in which a trusted centralized recommender stores only anonymous item rat-
ing averages and vote count data. Generic recommendations are possible in a number of
different scenarios, some of which provide significantly stricter privacy guarantees than
the ones possible in a data publishing setting.
2.6 Utility Metrics
A common approach used to measure utility in this field relies in the use of a proxy met-
ric that quantifies the changes done to the original dataset by the sanitization algorithm.
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Previous Work Utility Metric Type of Metric
Terrovitis et al. [43] Normalized Certainty Penalty
Proxy metric quantifying
changes to original dataset
Gkoulalas-Divanis
and Loukides [17]
Generalization-minimization
utility
Proxy metric quantifying
changes to original dataset
Parra-Arnau et al. [36] Forgery and suppression rate
Proxy metric quantifying
changes to original dataset
Chen et al. [12]
Relative error of
counting queries
Error on statistical
aggregates
Terrovitis et al. [44] Top-K deviation
Error on statistical
aggregates
Terrovitis et al. [44]
Relative error in the
support of term combinations
Error on statistical
aggregates
Zakerzadeh el al. [47] F-measure
Error on typical workload
results
Table 2: Types of Utility Metrics in Previous Work
This is also true regarding high-dimensional privacy-preserving data publishing work that
doesn’t rely on the quasi-identifier assumption. Terrovitis et al. [43] estimated the impact
of their generalization method by using Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP), which cap-
tures the degree of generalization the method enforces. Similarly, Gkoulalas-Divanis and
Loukides [17] rely on generalization-minimization utility measureswhich can be applied to
non-hierarchical generalizations, and Parra-Arnau et al. [36] use forgery and suppression
rate.
Another type of metrics validate statistical aggregates of the dataset. Chen et al. [12]
evaluates utility through the relative error of counting queries. Terrovitis et al. [44] rely on
two different metrics:
1. top-K deviation: the ratio of the top-K frequent itemsets of the original dataset that
appear in the top-K frequent itemsets of the anonymized data;
2. relative error in the support of term combinations, limited to combinations of size
two.
Finally, Zakerzadeh el al. [47] measure utility in terms of changes in classification accu-
racy, through F-measure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only previous high-di-
mensional privacy-preservingdata publishingwork that doesn’t rely on the quasi-identifier
assumption and that uses an approach based on results of a typical data mining workload
to measuring utility. Table 2 synthesizes the metrics used in such work, discussed in previ-
ous sections.
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3 Privacy and Utility Metrics for Tailored Recommendation
Scenarios
3.1 Tailoring Utility
As described in Section 2.6, privacy-preserving data publishing work typically addresses
utility as a secondary objective, an optimization target having defined a privacy goal. In
that context, the metrics used to quantify utility simply capture generic statistical prop-
erties of datasets or rely a proxy metric, being insufficient to conclude about real-world
applicability, failing to give clear insight regarding utility for some common data mining
workload. The one exception [47] has classification instead of prediction as the datamining
goal.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 2.5, generic recommendations are possible with-
out collection and publishing of personal data. Alternatively, tailored recommendations
require complex data analysis, enabled, among other methods, by performing data min-
ing on personal rating data. These data collection practices are justified by the benefit of
tailoring, that is not possible to achieve with access to aggregate data alone. Thus, having
applicability in mind and lacking existing satisfactory metrics, we consider a new utility
metric to be used within the context of privacy-preserving data publishing, focused on the
concept of tailored recommendations.
A realistic measure of utility in tailored recommendation scenarios is the prediction error
of data mining algorithms used to perform them. This error can be measured in terms of
root mean square error (RMSE) of the predicted values compared to the real values. Analo-
gously to the workload-centric approach that Zakerzadeh el al. [47] took to a classification
problem, we quantify the changes in prediction error for the original and sanitized ver-
sions of a dataset using the same prediction algorithm. Furthermore, because we work in
the context of tailored recommendations, the error of naı¨ve predictions based on aggregate
data is considered as a baseline.
Let us formally define Tailoring Utility. Let P be the prediction function of a tailored rec-
ommender system, and A a naı¨ve prediction function which predicts that all users rated
items with the average rating given to that item. Let now RMSE(P,D) be the RMSE re-
sulting from applying prediction function P to dataset D, and RMSE(A,D) be the RMSE
of using a rating function based on aggregate data A to predict ratings in datasetD.
Definition 1. Tailoring Utility of prediction function P for datasetD, µ(P,D), captures the
degree to which P adapts to the preferences of individual users in datasetD:
µ(P,D) = 1− (RMSE(P,D)/RMSE(A,D))
This new utility metric, Tailoring Utility, enables the comparison of sanitization processes
to be applied in recommendation data publishing scenarios. µ(P,D) is positive if tailoring
benefits predictions, and is proportional to the importance of tailoring in the recommenda-
tion.
Because data collection and publishing is justifiable only in tailored and not generic rec-
ommendation scenarios, we adopt a minimum acceptable value for utility: the utility pro-
vided by recommendations based on aggregate data. More formally, for a sanitization algo-
rithm S, let S(D) = D′ be the sanitized dataset. If µ(P,D) > 0, then, for S to be acceptable
in the context of tailored recommendations, µ(P,D′)must also be positive.
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3.2 Measuring Privacy
Privacy-preserving data publishing work has given strong privacy foundations in sanitiz-
ing datasets, by making rows indistinguishable or protecting against attribute disclosure,
while preserving some utility. However, most methods target static privacy guarantees and
easily destroy utility beyond the threshold that justifies personal data collection, meaning
that simply building aggregates and deleting personal data is a valid real-world alternative
to them. Aiming at a sanitization method applicable and useful in real-world scenarios, we
depart from the privacy preserving data publishing tradition of a static privacy guarantee.
Let us consider a privacy metric instead of a guarantee, and attempt to improve the overall
privacy-utility trade-off in data publishing for tailored recommendation scenarios.
A real-world adversary does not simply wish to defeat existing privacy protections. Thus,
instead of protecting absolutely against one type of attack, we consider the ultimate goal
of the adversary is to enrich his knowledge on the user. After gaining access to a database
which may contain a record that refers to that user, the adversary attempts to match his
auxiliary information against the records in the database. In case a record is found that
sufficiently matches the auxiliary information, the adversary considers the re-identification
successful. If not, the adversary considers that his attack failed, either because the user is
indistinguishable or not present in the database.
From an applicability point if view, it is beneficial to measure privacy instead of guarantee
it for two main reasons:
• for some scenarios the utility cost of guaranteeing privacy is simply too high to be
applicable;
• for some scenarios it may be enough to improve privacy just to the point that it be-
comes economically unviable to attack it.
Tailored recommendation scenarios are an example of such cases: current privacy guaran-
tees render entire datasets as useful as aggregate data and the disclosure of a few movie
ratings is not critical. In order to fill this gapwe introduce AdversaryGain, which, based on
some reference re-identification attack, quantifies the adversary reward: in average, how
many new attributes will an attack render.
We consider a probabilistic model, enabling us to tolerate error in the adversary’s aux-
iliary information. The base our attack model is the re-identification of Narayanan and
Shmatikov [31]. The strength of this attack model is well supported in the original paper,
and has been a reference for subsequent theoretical work [28]. One of the reasons why the
attack is so successful draws from the common long-tailed support distribution of sparse
high-dimensional datasets: there is a small number of attributes that have non-null values
for many records while there is a large number of attributes that only have non-null values
for a few records. This long-tailed distribution makes records very distinguishable even
by merely considering which attributes are defined and which ones aren’t. This represents
a privacy threat even if attribute values are obfuscated or omitted [31, 1], rendering value
obfuscation techniques almost useless since the very existence of a value is often enough to
convey the information necessary for a re-identification attack.
A natural metric for studying re-identification attacks in a probabilistic setting is the suc-
cess probability of the re-identification. This success probability is expected to increase
with the increase in auxiliary information, so we present it as a function of the amount of
auxiliary information available to the adversary. However, this metric does not capture our
notion of privacy breach. A trivial case where there is no privacy breach with a successful
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re-identification is the one in which the auxiliary information already contains all of the
user’s attributes that are non-null for the attacked dataset, as the adversary’s data pool on
the user remains unaltered. Thus, let us define Adversary Gain as our key privacy metric.
Definition 2. An adversary has access to an attacked dataset D, and to auxiliary informa-
tion aux about a user - a set of ratings that user gave to items possibly present in D. Let I
be his re-identification attack function, which outputs the set of ratings present in dataset
D correctly identified to belong that user, and an empty set otherwise. Then, let the Adver-
sary Gain (AG) of an attack on dataset D be the number of new attributes regarding that
user rendered by the attack:
AG(D, aux) = |I(D, aux) \ aux|
A key benefit of this metric is that it allows us to take an economical look on an adver-
sary’s incentives. Bringing AG below certain values will render attacks economically un-
viable, which should be enough for a variety of practical applications, especially in high-
dimensional data scenarios. Assuming the cost of performing one attack is greater than the
reward of acquiring one rating, a target value of 1 for AG would be an acceptable value.
However, an estimation of acceptable AG values is out of scope of this work, as it would
require data on attack cost.
4 Record Fragmentation
4.1 Rationale
Most work in recommender systems attempts to identify similarities between users in or-
der to perform recommendations. The underlying assumption is that if some users rated n
items similarly, they will also rate other items similarly [40]. The characteristic that makes
recommenders perform well are similarities between users, and it must be possible to pro-
cess a dataset in a way to leverage those same similarities to make users more indistin-
guishable in the dataset, achieving better privacy at a very reduced utility cost. In this
Section we will present a sanitization method aiming to validate this idea.
In the context of computer communications and networks, the concept of pseudonym
has been extensively used to designate a temporary or scoped identifier of a subject [38].
An historic reference to “digital pseudonym” is made in a 1981 paper by Chaum [9] while
describing the use of public key cryptography in such a way that it allows users to send ver-
ifiable messages while protecting their identity. Subsequently Chaum described the use of
digital pseudonyms for interacting with multiple organizations while preventing that these
organizations collude in order to build a profile of the user [10]. The pseudonym used with
one organization is unlinkable with the one used with another organizations. Furthermore
the user can prove the possession of some credentials obtained from one organization to
another without revealing the pseudonym he uses to interact with the first. While the typ-
ical case is to use one pseudonym per organization the use of one-time pseudonyms, and
more generally multiple pseudonyms per organization, is also mentioned.
In this paper we use the concept of pseudonyms in the context of privacy-preserving
high-dimensional data publishing. Each record - representing an individual - is split into
several records with different identifiers, i.e. pseudonyms, and the values of non-null at-
tributes are distributed among the new records, i.e. fragments. As a direct consequence
the linking between different attribute values is broken. No values are changed, inserted
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UID M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 3 5 4
2 2 5 5 1
3 4 1
4 3 3 2 4
5 4 5 4
(a) Original Dataset
Nym M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 4 1
2 4 4
3 2 1
4 3
5 5 5
6 5
7 3 2
8 3 4
9 5 4
(b) Fragmented Dataset
Nym UID
1 3
2 5
3 2
4 1
5 2
6 5
7 4
8 4
9 1
(c) PseudonymMapping
Figure 1: Record Fragmentation Example
or deleted: sets of values are simply unlinked from each other. Each record is fragmented
in several pseudonymous versions of it. The linking of these fragments using pseudonym
mapping information restores the original data, thus is to remain unpublished. From a
data privacy perspective, record fragmentation is vertical partitioning applied per record.
Previous work has employed different forms of vertical partitioning to improve privacy,
however it was either applied in the dataset as a whole [47] or to horizontal partitions of
the dataset [25, 44]. In our approach we consider each record to be an horizontal partition
and apply vertical partitioning independently to each of them. This approach also has sim-
ilarities with Gkoulalas-Divanis and Loukides’ clustering-based anonymization [17]: our
fragments are conceptually similar to their clusters, but instead of using generalization,
only suitable for high-dimensional itemset datasets, we perform partitioning.
Record fragmentation is illustrated in Figure 1: each record of the original dataset is split
in several, forming the sanitized dataset and the mapping between the identifiers of the
two datasets. We assume that the sanitized dataset is accessible to the adversary while the
mapping dataset is either destroyed, stored securely, or distributed among the users - each
user holds the pseudonyms that refer to him.
The choice of which values are presented together and which are separated in different
fragments is done based on the statistical properties of the dataset. Following the principles
used in condensation approaches [3], it is desirable to keep inter-attribute correlations as
much as possible in order to reduce the utility loss. In order to do so, a meaningful distance
measure between dataset values is required. However, it has been argued that the distances
to the nearest and farthest neighbours from a given target in high-dimensional space is
almost the same for a variety of data distributions and distance functions [1] [2] [7]. For that
reason some dimensionality reduction technique should be applied before using distance
functions. Also, records with greater support can be fragmented more times than records
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with smaller support, in order to avoid the new user problem of recommender systems as
much as possible.
On the privacy side, the aim is to reduce the amount of information conveyed by the pres-
ence of a (non-null) value. The amount of information is directly related to the frequency
of the value: if only a few records have a value assigned for a specific attribute, then that
attribute is more distinctive than others. Separating rare occurrences of values is key to
make records less distinguishable, increasing resilience to re-identification attacks [28].
4.2 Algorithm
In order to formally describe the algorithm, the matrix model of datasets is used. Let
datasetD be an N x Mmatrix where each row ri is associated with an individual and each
column cj with an attribute. Record di,j refers to the value that the individual associated
with ri has for the attribute associated with column cj .
In order to estimate column distance, so that the fragmentation can be done minimiz-
ing the error, matrix factorization was used as a dimensionality reduction technique. In a
preprocessing step D is factorized in f features, originating two matrices: the RF N x f
matrix, showing the correlation between rows and features, and the CF f x Mmatrix, with
the correlation between features and columns. Also during preprocessing, the support -
the number of non-null values of each row or column - is respectively captured in vectors
RS and CS. The algorithm then generates the dataset D′, an P x M matrix, in which P is
the total number of pseudonyms used, greater than N, the original number of individuals.
Each row of D′ is basically a fragment of an original row ri ofD.
To perform the fragmentation, values are clustered together based on their column char-
acteristics. A number of the lowest support columns for which an original row has values
defined are fixed as centroids for each new record. The number of lowest-support columns
that are elected as centroids depends on the chosen privacy-utility trade-off parameters.
After the centroids are assigned, a simple one-pass value assignment is performed based
on a distance measure between the column of the value and the defined centroids. This is a
lightweight approach to grouping allowing column-neighbour values to be kept together,
especially when compared with possible alternatives which include clustering algorithms
like K-Means.
The algorithm starts by iterating over the N rows ri of D, each generating a number of
new rows in D′. Given an original row ri, the collection of j for which di,j is non-null
is temporarily stored and sorted in ascending order by their cardinality value csj . The
resulting vector J is used to create the new rows iteratively. In case the cardinality value
csj of the current iteration is below a certain threshold t, then a new row d
′
p is created in
D′, otherwise the row creation iterations for that original row ri stops.
Let X be the number of successful iterations, and consequently the number of assigned
pseudonyms for original row ri. For each ri a X x f temporary centroid matrix CFi is
built by assigning the column features cfj for the X first values of J . Finally the algorithm
iterates over the records di,j of row ri, assigning each of them to one of the new rows d
′
p.
For that the feature vector cfj is considered and its distance is calculated to each of the rows
in CFi, which represent the centroids. The record is assigned to the centroid to which it
has lowest distance and assigned to the corresponding new row.
The result of the algorithm is dataset D′, an P x M matrix such that P ≥ N, and that
has the same number of non-null records as D. The distance function dist used in our
implementation was Euclidean Distance but other distance measures could be considered.
Experimenting with different distance measures would likely slightly influence the RMSE,
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Algorithm 1 Record Fragmentation Algorithm
initializeD′;
for all ri do
initialize CFi;
x = 0;
for all csj referring to di,j in ri, by ascending order of values do
if csj ≤ t then
add row d′p associtated with x;
add row CFix with the values csj ;
increment x
else
break;
end if
end for
for all di,j in ri do
for all x in CFix do
tempx = dist(j, CF ix)
end for
xmin = x for the value of x that minimizes tempx
add record di,j to row d
′
p associated with xmin;
end for
end for
randomize row order of D′;
but the results obtained with Euclidean Distance were enough to demonstrate the potential
of this approach, as shown by the results in Section 6. Instead, we consideredmore relevant
to experiment with different thresholds t, since this parameter has a key influence in the
privacy-utility trade-off.
We used a function to calculate the threshold value t in each iteration, instead of a fixed
value. This allows us to tune the amount of created fragments per row. The considered
threshold function takes in 2 parameters. The first is an estimation for a threshold attribute
cardinality value, tc, indicating whether a non-null value is considered a rare occurrence.
The second is a target number of fragments for a user, np, depending on the cardinal-
ity of that user. The function itself is linear: the threshold value is the estimated attribute
cardinality when the number of attributed pseudonyms matches the target number of frag-
ments, and it varies with the number of attributed pseudonyms, x.
Thr(tc, np, x) = tc ∗ (x/np)
The second parameter is itself also a function that maps user cardinality to the target num-
ber of fragments. We used a logarithm-based function for it, which can be parametrized
in order to allow increasing or reducing the target number of fragments for the same user
cardinality, |u| , respectively leading to more privacy or more utility. We picked logarith-
mic over linear because it preserves the long-tail of the user cardinality frequency function,
which is characteristic for this kind of datasets, otherwise the application of the algorithm
would be trivial to detect. The two parameters, p1 and p2, allow varying the NPseudo
function, respectively in a linear and in a logarithmic way.
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NPseudo(p1, p2, |u|) = p1 ∗ log(1 + (|u|/p2))
The impact of p1 and p2 variation in pseudonym attribution is empirically analysed in
section 6.1.
5 Experiments Description and Implementation
5.1 Datasets
The objective of the Netflix Prize [33] was to come up with a recommendation algorithm
that, trained with a supplied dataset, performed 10% better than the reference algorithm,
Cinematch, which scored 0.9514 RMSE on the test dataset. The Grand Prize was won by
an aggregate team of previously competing teams called BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos [34].
Their algorithm scored 0.8567 RMSE, a 10.06% improvement on Cinematch.
The Netflix training dataset consists of movie ratings, from 1 to 5, submitted by Netflix
users, with the submission date, organized by movie id. The movie ids are sequential
and range from 1 to 17770, unlike user ids, which range from 1 to 2649429 but amount to
only 480189 distinct values. The dataset accounts for a total of 100480507 ratings, which
represents 1.1% of the possible rankings for the considered number of users and movies.
In order to confirm results in different datasets, another freely availablewell-knownmovie
ratings dataset was considered. Movielens is a dataset made available by the University of
Minnesota, crowdsourced via their web site [19], with the purpose of gathering data for re-
search in recommendation systems and providing movie recommendations to users. There
are currently three releases of the dataset made available to the public [20] which have dif-
ferent sizes with the biggest having 10000054 ratings - significantly smaller than the 100
million ratings fromNetflix. These ratings are given by 69878 users to 10677movies, which
means Movielens is slightly less sparse than Netflix having 1.3% non-null values.
For the experiments described, the Movielens dataset was converted to the Netflix for-
mat, so that the same setup and code could be used. This included rounding the ratings
up because Netflix supports integer ratings from 1 to 5 while Movielens supports 10 pos-
sible values for ratings: 0.5 to 5 with 0.5 steps. Because our goal is simply to compare the
recommendation accuracy between the original and resulting datasets, the pre-experiment
rounding process isn’t an influencing factor.
5.2 Reference Re-Identification Algorithm
Narayanan and Shmatikov presented a generic algorithm for re-identification in sparse
datasets and applied it to the Netflix dataset with interesting results [31]. The algorithm
has two variations named Scoreboard and Scoreboard-RH, and they both rely in the over-
whelmingly low similarity between users of the dataset. The mere information about
which movies users rated makes them very distinguishable, especially because of non-
mainstream movies which are not rated by many users. Even with incorrect and incom-
plete auxiliary data or dataset perturbation, it is possible to re-identify many users with a
good probability. For this reason, Narayanan and Shmatikov assigned a weight to the dif-
ferent movies depending on the size of their support set, supp. Furthermore, they defined
similarity between two rows as a kind of cosine similarity: Sim maps a pair of records to
the interval [0, 1]. The Scoreboard-RH algorithm is a more robust version than Scoreboard
and it defines a scoring function Score which assigns a numerical score to each record in
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the database D based on how well it matches the attacker’s auxiliary information over a
target user, aux.
Score(aux, di) =
∑
j∈supp(aux) wt(j) × Sim(auxj, di,j)
where wt(j) = 1log |supp(j)|
After Score is calculated for all the rows di Scoreboard-RH takes the two highest scores
and calculates how different they are in relation to the standard deviation. If the value is
bigger than a defined “eccentricity” parameter φ, then the best match is considered to be a
successful re-identification. Otherwise the algorithm outputs no match.
max1−max2
σ
> φ
In order to evaluate how susceptible the resulting datasets are to re-identification we im-
plemented our version of Scoreboard-RH. Original work considered that Sim would out-
put 1 on a pair of movies rated by different subscribers if the ratings and dates are within
some threshold, and 0 otherwise. For simplicity purposes, and to consider the same data in
the utility and privacy analyses, we disregard dates in our implementation of Scoreboard-
RH, relying only in the ratings information. Apart from that, we instantiated our version
of Scoreboard-RH as did Narayanan and Shmatikov:
• the Sim function will output 1 in case the rating of a movie in the two rows matches
and 0 otherwise;
• the eccentricity parameter φ is set to 1.5.
We consider the re-identification successful for the fragmented datasets in case the algo-
rithm outputs any pseudonym that refers to the user to which the supplied auxiliary infor-
mation belongs to. Our Scoreboard-RH implementation uses a random sampling approach
to evaluate the re-identification success: auxiliary information of a certain size referring to
a random individual from the original data set is randomly sampled and used to match it
in a target dataset. The estimation of the results is done for a 95% confidence interval and
2% error margin, so the sampling is repeated according to the number of samples required
using the normal approximation for a binomial proportion interval (Wald interval). We
found it to require 300 iterations in the best case and above 2400 in the worst case.
5.3 Reference Recommendation Algorithm
Motivated by the Netflix Prize competition, there was source code contributed by con-
testants that could be used to perform basic operations with the dataset. Two contribu-
tions deserved our attention: the Netflix Recommender Framework [29] and, based on it,
the Kadri Framework [23]. These frameworks provide functions to efficiently process the
Netflix dataset text files, as well as implementations of some recommendation algorithm
primitives, namely average, matrix factorization, K-NN and prediction blending. Another
function provided by these frameworks is the possibility to scrub the probe data from the
dataset: the probe data is removed from the training set, effectively separating the training
and test sets, increasing the reliability of the RMSE results.
Using these frameworks, we created a reference prediction algorithm by blending movie
average and matrix factorization predictions. These algorithms ignore date information,
relying only on movie ratings, similarly to what was done regarding the re-identification
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algorithm, described in Section 5.2. Our reference prediction algorithm scored 0.921299
RMSE on Netflix, a better result than the original Cinematch algorithm.
5.4 Reference Privacy Preservation Algorithm
To the extent of our knowledge, the pre-existing technique most similar to record frag-
mentation is disassociation [44]. As explained in Section 4.1, both methods use forms of
horizontal and vertical partitioning to fulfill their objective of protecting privacy in high-
dimensional datasets. The main difference is that disassociation has km-anonymity as its
objective, a static privacy guarantee, while record fragmentation has a target number of
fragments function, representing the privacy-utility trade-off.
Disassociation was chosen also because km-anonymity is one of the most relaxed privacy
guarantees defined, and yet not relaxed enough to cope with tailored recommendation sce-
narios. The partitioning applied with disassociation generates a dataset where the great
majority of records have a support of 1 or 2, as explained in the choice of the evaluation
parameters [44, p. 952]. This may be enough for associating query some items together
but not to perform tailored recommendations. In order to validate this concern, we imple-
mented the disassociation algorithms, VERPART and HORPART [44], targeted at achieving
the most relaxed privacy guarantee possible with that method: 22-anonymity. Because we
setm = 2, we didn’t need to implement the REFINE algorithm, as it only has an impact for
m > 2.
5.5 Implementation Detail
A Netfix Commons library was created in Java to provide quick and memory-efficient ac-
cess to the dataset. Heuristics were used to improve access times to data without requiring
more memory for the representation. Both our Scoreboard-RH, Record Fragmentation and
disassociation [44] implementations use this library.
The preprocessing and main steps of the algorithm described in Section 4.2 were imple-
mented separately. The preprocessing step that involves matrix factorization and attribute
cardinality count, which in the Netflix case is the number of ratings per user, was imple-
mented in C++ using the Kadri Framework. This generates 3 text files each containing a
matrix: user-features, movie-features and user ratings. The main step of the algorithm was
implemented in Java. It requires access to the 3 text files from preprocessing and to the
original data set, and it generates the fragmented version of the dataset in the same format
as the original one, a probe file in accordance to the resulting dataset, and a pseudonym
mapping file to match the attributed pseudonyms to the original user ids for evaluation
purposes. For performance purposes, a safe cardinality value for movies was introduced
in the implementation. If the movie has a number of ratings above this value then it is not
considered to be a centroid. This significantly reduces the number of movies that we need
to sort by cardinality, consequently reducing the time our quicksort takes.
All the implemented source code (record fragmentation, disassociation, rating prediction
and RMSE calculation) is available on GitHub [18].
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Figure 2: Support Analysis of Netflix and Movielens Datasets
6 Results
6.1 Partitioning Analysis
Support analysis to both datasets shows similar long tail patterns both regarding users and
movies: a fewmovies/users havemany (non-null) ratingswhile themajority of users/movies
have only a few ratings, as shown in Figure 2. Netflix shows frequency maxima in users
and movies for low cardinalities: 18 and 119 respectively. Movielens has their maximum
frequency values for the lowest cardinalities possible: 20 for users and 1 for movies - the
Movielens site imposes that each user rates at least 20 movies on registration so that it can
deliver meaningful recommendations, avoiding the new user problem.
The algorithm preprocessing step described in 4.2 was run only once on each of the orig-
inal datasets to create the required matrix files. Then the main algorithm was run several
times, each of the runs generating a fragmented version of the original dataset. Different
privacy-utility trade-off parameters were used in each run, resulting in different fragmen-
tation levels. As described in Section 4.2, the considered trade-off parameters were:
• the movie cardinality safe value, until whichmovies are considered to initialize group
centroids;
• the target movie cardinality value, the last value for which a movie is elected as a
centroid in case the user was assigned exactly the target number of pseudonyms;
• the target number of fragments function, for which we assumed different parameters
for the logarithm function.
The first two parameters were set based on the movie cardinality of the dataset. The
movie cardinality safe value was set to a conservative value of 5000, merely for improving
the algorithm processing times, expected not to influence the number of created fragments.
The targetmovie cardinality valuewas set to 500 by looking at the Netflix movie cardinality
distribution, as it represents the start of the long tail and divides the movie domain in half:
approximately 48% of the movies have less than 500 ratings. In order to simplify, since both
an increase in the target movie cardinality and a linear increase on the target fragments
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Dataset Netflix Movielens
Original 480189 69878
Frag1 746153 157421
Frag2 1441715 330961
Frag3 3057962 735668
Frag4 5039491 1324378
Frag5 7292946 2008289
Frag6 9111456 2676293
2Dis 82685159 8437233
Table 3: Number of Rows in the Original and Fragmented Datasets
is equivalent, we consider these first two parameters to be fixed and we vary the target
number of fragments function for the trade-off.
The fragmentation experiments were run on a virtual machine with 1 virtual core and
4GB of RAM allocated, running Java HotSpot VM on Ubuntu Linux, hosted by a Intel
Core i7 machine. The measured run-times for the Netflix dataset were approximately 10
minutes for the least aggressive fragmentation and 1 hour for the most aggressive one.
For the Movielens dataset the run-times were from 2 to 11 minutes. These results confirm
the expected linear run-time scalability with respect to the target number of fragments,
as well as an overhead related to the size of the dataset for input/output operations. In
the same conditions, our implementation of 22-anonymous disassociation took orders of
magnitude longer to be completed: approximately 9 hours for Movielens and 95 hours for
Netflix. Note that these results suggest that the algorithm run-time grows linearly with the
number of ratings, as Netflix has approximately 10 times more ratings than Movielens, but
conclusive results would require further work.
The target number of fragments function, as described in Section 4.2 is based on a log-
arithm function to which two parameters are applied, one allowing to vary the function
linearly and other logarithmically. Six fragmented datasets were generated from applying
the algorithm with different parameters, and numbered according to their aggressiveness,
being 1 the most utility-friendly and 6 the most privacy friendly. Table 3 shows the number
of rows of the resulting datasets, both for the Netflix and Movielens cases, compared with
the number of rows resulting from 22-anonymous Disassociation. As expected (see Section
5.4) the number of rows generated by 22-anonymous disassociation comes very close to the
number of total ratings. The average row support of 22disassociated Netflix is 1.215, and
for Movielens is 1.185, illustrating the strictness of the method.
6.2 Utility Evaluation
In order to evaluate the results in terms of utility, the recommendation algorithm imple-
mentation described in Section 5.3 was run in the original and fragmented datasets. As
explained in Section 3.1, the RMSE value itself does not convey a direct understanding on
the utility loss in the context of tailored recommendations. For that reason the Tailored
Utility (µ) metric is used. In order to calculate it, we consider the naı¨ve prediction function
to be the average movie rating, and take the following RMSE values as reference: 1.05282
for Netflix and 0.946021 for Movielens. These RMSE values of the naı¨ve prediction are
the same for all datasets because both record fragmentation and Terrovitis’ Disassociation
both rely exclusively on partitioning, leaving the ratings themselves and their association
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Netflix Movielens
Dataset RMSE µ RMSE µ
Average 1.05282 0 0.946021 0
Original 0.921299 0.124923 0.874797 0.075288
Frag1 0.931068 0.115643 0.855595 0.095585
Frag2 0.944055 0.103308 0.850197 0.101292
Frag3 0.978027 0.071041 0.852461 0.098899
Frag4 0.979276 0.069854 0.862424 0.088368
Frag5 0.981908 0.067355 0.869907 0.080458
Frag6 0.985127 0.064297 0.875914 0.074108
2Dis 1.053909 -0.001034 0.948689 -0.00282
Table 4: RMSE of the Predictions for the Different Datasets
to movies unaltered.
The RMSE results, as well as the our utility metric µ, are depicted in Table 4. It can be seen
that, generally, the higher the fragmentation, the more significant is the utility loss. How-
ever this is not true for the more utility-friendly Movielens generated datasets, where a
RMSE reduction is observed. This is explained by a side-effect of the algorithm and chosen
metrics. Similarly to what is observed for the condensation method, where the classifica-
tion accuracy improves due to a noise reduction effect [3], in the fragmentation case keep-
ing nearest movies together initially increases prediction accuracy. The minimum error
is reached at certain fragmentation level, where the information being removed from the
dataset is no longer mostly noise and starts to be useful information, observed to be close
the average of 5 fragments per record. After that point the utility-improvement effect fades
as the fragmentation becomesmore aggressive, exhibiting degradedutility at themost frag-
mented case tested. Disassociation, because it strictly enforces a privacy guarantee, even
its most relaxed instantiation, 22-anonymity completely destroys µ. Otherwise successful
prediction algorithms become less useful, when applied to a disassociated dataset, than
considering the movie average for prediction.
6.3 Re-Identification Evaluation
To evaluate the risk of re-identification, Scoreboard-RHwas run using the implementation
described in Section 5.2, with the auxiliary information being built randomly from the orig-
inal dataset. This enables the evaluation of re-identification success with increasing sizes
of auxiliary information, at the cost of some generality: for higher values of auxiliary infor-
mation the random sampling becomes skewed as not all users can be considered, only the
ones that have at least the required number of ratings.
The re-identification success of the fragmented datasets behaves similarly as it does on
the original dataset, as seen in Figure 3: re-identification success rises rapidly as available
auxiliary information size increases. The re-identification success reaches its maxima and
stabilizes for auxiliary information sizes of 20 to 25 for all the versions of the Netflix dataset.
The difference is the maxima value: while for the original dataset the success rate reaches
100%, as previously shown by Narayanan and Shmatikov, for the fragmented ones the
maxima is lower, depending on how aggressive fragmentation was.
Similar behaviour is observed for the originalMovielens dataset (Figure 4), with Scoreboard-
RH reaching 100% re-identification success for the same values of auxiliary information
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Figure 3: Re-identification Success Rate on Original and Generated Netflix Datasets by Size
of Available Auxiliary Information
size. The fragmented datasets also exhibit comparable behaviour with increases in re-iden-
tification success for increasing size of auxiliary information until the maxima are reached
at approximately the same values. However in this case, as fragmentation increases, the
success rate doesn’t plateau near the maxima but decreases instead: more auxiliary infor-
mation apparently leads to less re-identification success. This is originated by the skew
effect previously referred: auxiliary information generation is more skewed towards users
with more ratings for higher sizes. The decrease of re-identification success with the in-
crease of auxiliary information size merely shows that users that originally had more rat-
ings are better protected against re-identification. Although this can be observed more
clearly inMovielens fragmented datasets, it is also noticeable in Netflix’s most aggressively
fragmented datasets.
Because 22-anonymity only guarantees protection against an adversary with knowledge
of at most 2 items, as the auxiliary information size increases the probability of it contain-
ing more than 2 non-disassociated items also increases. Consequently, the 22-disassociated
dataset behaves in an inverse manner to the fragmented ones, with re-identification prob-
ability steadily rising with increases in auxiliary information, but at very low values.
Because of the auxiliary information sampling skew effect, we estimate the real re-identi-
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Figure 4: Re-identification Success Rate on Original and Generated Movielens Datasets by
Size of Available Auxiliary Information
fication success based on the values for the auxiliary information size interval where global
success maxima are found for most aggressively fragmented datasets - 20 to 25 items. This
maxima interval coincides with the re-identification success plateuing for the least aggres-
sively fragmented datasets. In Figure 5 the re-identification results - success, inconclusive
or wrong result - for each of the datasets in the success maxima interval are shown. In-
conclusive results grow faster for low fragmentation datasets and then stabilize around
30%. Scoreboard-RH shows significant resilience to wrong results for low fragmentation
datasets, but as fragmentation increases wrong outputs becomemore noticeable, especially
after inconclusive results stabilize. Netflix and Movielens datasets show similar behaviour,
with the Movielens dataset showing itself as more privacy-friendly than Netflix.
Unsurprisingly, 22-disassociation is extremely effective, returning an inconclusive result
around 95% of the times for both datasets. However, Scoreboard-RH does manage to suc-
cessfully re-identify the target in a few occurrences, demonstrating its strength. Further-
more, in real-life scenarios it may be beneficial that the adversary isn’t able to trivially
detect the use of a sanitization algorithm. While AG shows no difference between wrong
and inconclusive results, from an economical point of view it’s worse for an adversary to
have false positives (wrong results) than true negatives (inconclusive results) [22].
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Figure 5: Re-identification Results at Success Maxima Interval per Dataset
6.4 Adversary Gain Evaluation
As argued in Section 3.2, because re-identification rate is an incomplete privacy metric, we
use it to calculate the AG metric. This metric estimates the worth of the attack from the
adversary’s point of view - higher values mean less privacy. The goal of a sanitization al-
gorithm doesn’t have to be noAG, but a low enough value that makes attacks economically
unviable.
Figure 6 shows the AG significantly decreases for fragmented datasets, especially for the
Movielens case. Generally, relative to the original case, the reduction in AG is significantly
greater than the reduction of µ for the user. This indicates that record fragmentation has
a positive effect on the overall privacy-utility trade-off. 22-disassociation renders residual
AG, as positive AG can only occur for successful re-identification of rows with more than
2 items, which comprise of a very small fraction of the disassociated dataset.
7 Conclusion
Previous work in privacy preserving data publishing for the high-dimensional case is cur-
rently not useful for tailored recommendation scenarios. Existing privacy guarantees de-
stroy the benefits that can be harnessed by publishing datasets because recommendations
of similar utility are possible by simply accessing aggregate data. However, the user pat-
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Figure 6: Adversary Gain (AG) at Success Maxima Interval per Dataset
terns that make tailored recommendations possible may also provide some degree of pri-
vacy protection to those users. Driven by this idea, we present a new utility metric, to be
used in tailored recommendation scenarios, and a privacy metric instead of a static guar-
antee. Also we present a sanitization method that relies on per-record vertical partitioning,
inspired by distributed systems work in pseudonyms, that aims to validate that is possible
to significantly improve privacy while maintaining tailoring capabilities.
The metrics were defined with applicability in mind. Tailoring Utility measures how well
a database-algorithm pair adapts tailored recommendations to the preferences of individ-
ual users, compared to generic popularity-based recommendations. Adversary Gain quan-
tifies the adversary reward per attack: in average, how many new attributes will an attack
render.
The presented sanitization method limits the probability of re-identification attack suc-
cess independently of the available auxiliary information size. The method performs well
regarding both metrics, reducing very significantly Adversary Gain at a reduced Tailoring
Utility cost. The method is completely truthful: all values are unchanged (no generaliza-
tion or noise), there are no artificial values included in the result (no synthetic data), and
no original value is omitted (no suppression). Instead it unlinks sets of values that be-
long to the same record, fragmenting them into several records based on simple metrics
of privacy and utility optimization: separation of rare occurrences and link preservation
of “neighbour” attributes, based on some distance function. While similar fragmentation
methods are employed in related work, some methods rely in the quasi-identifier assump-
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tion [16, 25], and the others aim to achieve privacy guarantees that are too destructive for
tailored recommendations [12, 43, 44, 47].
The pseudonym mapping which results from the process can be destroyed or stored in a
secure, inaccessible location, because it isn’t required to perform recommendations. It can
also be distributed among the users’ recommendation clients, enabling the combination
of several estimations belonging to pseudonyms of the same user locally. Possible direc-
tions for future work include the development of an interactive version of the algorithm,
enabling new ratings to be added to a sanitized dataset, as well as a mathematical analy-
sis of the re-identification limits under the use of record fragmentation, analogous to what
Parra-Arnau, Rebollo and Forn [36] did for suppression and forgery.
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